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IN

April 1949 the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce began to hold a series of hearings for the purpose of
investigating the financial stability and operational efficiency of the
air-line industry. These hearings continued through June 1949 and
were resumed again for two days in January of this year. Subsequently,
a document of some 2,500 pages has been published containing the
testimony of 86 persons, in addition to considerable correspondence
and miscellaneous data.
The purpose of the investigation, as revealed in the letter signed
by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, inviting
witnesses to appear was "to learn why, in a period of unprecedented

prosperity, the air-line industry is in such poor financial condition."
The letter further asked: "Can it be explained by excessive competition? Is it poor management and loose, easy-going financial policies? Are there too many vice presidents with unlimited expense accounts and too elaborate downtown ticket offices? Is it the continuing
impact of postwar reconversion and expansion? Has it resulted from
administrative practices by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Civil
Aeronautics Administration? Is it due to policies laid down by Congress?" 1 These and other questions were asked.
* Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Chicago, Illinois, December 27, 1950.
1 Air-line Industry Investigation. Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 50 before
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, 81st
Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (April 11, 1949-Jan. 31, 1950) p. 2.
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SUBSIDY

AND COMPETITION ARE MAJOR ISSUES

Review of the testimony collected during the "Air-line Industry
Investigation" finds two major issues continually crowding other problems of public policy from the scene. The first is the question of
subsidy - to what extent should commercial air transportation be promoted by means of public aids or subsidies? The second is the question of competition - to what extent should competition be restricted
in commercial air transportation? At the risk of neglecting other important areas of public policy toward air commerce, it seems desirable
because of their pre-eminence to limit this discussion to a brief consideration of these two areas of great controversy.
Inasmuch as freedom from government support and freedom from
government control are often considered essential to the preservation
of the American system of private enterprise, we may well consider
the possible short-run and long-run effects of surrendering these freedoms to a considerable extent in our public policy toward commercial
aviation. It has been said that the price of security is the loss of freedom. Thus, there is a distinct relationship between government subsidy and government control -not only of competition but of many
other things. He who accepts subsidy must accept government control.
Competition may be restricted in transportation even without regard to the question of subsidy. Since 1920 railroad competition has
been subject to government restrictions and the same has been true
of motor carrier competition since 1935. These restrictions of free
competition in transportation have been based on a fairly recent development in the philosophy of transportation regulation, namely,
protection of the carrier from "excessive" or "destructive" competition. Because this is a far cry from the original public policy of encouraging carrier competition and restricting monopoly, it represents
a highly controversial question. The question resolves itself to whether,
like railroads, air lines shall be treated as public utilities and subjected
to the full gamut of public utility controls, or whether they will serve
the public better and achieve greater prosperity if treated as relatively
free competitive enterprises performing a public service.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF AIR TRANSPORT

SUBSIDIES

What is subsidy? What is public aid? Are these two things equivalent? While the two terms are frequently used interchangeably, there
might be some advantage to making a distinction between them. Fundamentally, a subsidy is a gift - a one-way transaction, without provision for repayment. Public aids, on the other hand, are often in the
nature of temporary grants or loans - two-way transactions, with definite provision for reimbursement of the public treasury. It is important to note that public aids may include subsidies as well as temporary
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aids which are eventually repaid in some tangible way. Thus "public
aid" is a broader term than "subsidy." 1
A recent study entitled Subsidies to Transportationby Burton N.
Behling, states that "in addition to the element of direct subsidy included in air-mail payments to the domestic and U.S. flag international
airlines, these carriers also are subsidized (indirectly) by the provision
of airport and airway facilities and other navigation aids. ' 2 The airlines have also benefited from government aeronautical research and
development and this type of aid may become more imporant if Congress decides to finance the development of "prototype" aircraft for
both civil and military purposes.
In order to assist an infant air transport industry, Congress in 1938
authorized the payment of subsidies, in the form of air-mail pay, to
meet the legitimate financial needs of the certificated air carriers.3 The
valid measure of the amount of subsidy to the carriers receiving airmail payments is the excess of such payments over the costs to the
carriers of rendering the air-mail service, including a reasonable allowance for return on investment. 4 In recent years air-mail payments
have increased substantially- from $46 million to all air carriers in
1946 to $112 million in 1949. In addition, in 1949 the carriers received $30 million in retroactive mail pay to cover their losses before
1949. When various witnesses were asked how much of the air-mail
pay represented subsidy, no one could say. Estimates ranged from 40
to 60 per cent.5 The problem was sized up thus by Postmaster General Donaldson:
"The total cost for both domestic and foreign air mail this year
is, in round numbers, about $120 million, and by the highest
stretch of the imagination you could not presume to state that the
subsidy would be more than half of that, if that much ... I have my
doubts about the subsidy being more than around $35 million, but
nobody has yet determined what is the fair and reasonable rate we
should pay for this service that is performed for us, and until
la See U.S. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Public Aids to Transportation, Vol. 1 p. 4 footnotes and the sentence: "It became clear early in ...
this series of studies that the term 'subsidy,' unless given a much broader meaning than it commonly conveys, would not suffice to cover the varied forms which
(public) aid to transportation has taken." (Italics supplied.) On the other hand,
the U.S. Board of Investigation and Research, Public Aids to Domestic Transportation (p. 53) does not clear up the confusion when it says "There appears
to be no significant difference between 'public aid' and 'subsidy,' and hence the
two terms are used interchangeably . . ."

Webster's International Dictionary

emphasizes the gift aspect of subsidies. RFC loans and Federal land grants to
railroads are good examples of public aids, but since they involved definite terms
for recompense to the government, they cannot be considered gifts or as having
any likeness whatsoever to the ordinary concept of subsidies, viz., agricultural
subsidies.
2 Behling, Burton N. Subsidies to Transportation, Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service, Public Affairs Bulletin, No. 86, August 1950, p. 30.
3 Article by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, "Proposed Senate Action on Air
Mail Subsidies" 17 J. Air L. & Com. 253 (Summer 1950).
4 U. S. Board of Investigation and Research. Public Aids to Domestic Transportation (H. Doc. 159, 79th Cong. 1st sess., staff report, p. 75).
5 Article by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, op. cit. p. 254.
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somebody determines what we ought to pay the air carrier for the
service he performs for us and what is the right rate of pay we
should pay him, then and only then can you separate the subsidy

from the total payment." 6

There has come to be general agreement not only among committees of Congress and government agencies concerned, but also
among some of the scheduled air-mail carriers that subsidy should be
separated from mail pay. For instance, President E. V. Rickenbacker
of Eastern Air Lines told the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee:
"A tragic error which has been committed by the CAB and by
many of the leaders of the industry has been the assumption that
Section 2 and Section 406-the mail pay section--of the act have
set air transportation apart from all other businesses and have
made it immune to the grim necessities of sound business practices
each air
and have promised it a blank check and have guaranteed
'7
carrier a livelihood at the expense of the taxpayers."

In an interim report submitted May 5, 1950 to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Johnson recommended that subsidy be
separated from air mail payments. However, he suggested that the
direct subsidy for domestic air transportation "should be specifically
identified and presented to Congress on a community basis." His report referred to significant evidence collected by his committee that,
in general, airlines carrying only a long-haul business -and servicing
but a few high-density points could operate profitably without direct
subsidy.8 Thus considerable attention is currently being given to the
subsidy element in air-mail pay. But, what about the indirect subsidies
to commercial air transportation through provision of airways and
airports at public expense?
Taxpayers of the United States have an investment of about one
and one-half billion dollars in civil airports. Of the larger airports,
which are financed by Federal, 'State and local appropriations, only
a handful are self-supporting even to the extent of returning out-of
pocket operating and maintenance expenses.9 The Federal Aid Airport Program for the 1951 fiscal year involves a total expenditure of
$51 million of which $25 million is Federal funds and $26 million are
state and local funds. 10
From its inception in 1925 through the year 1949 total expenditures on the Federal Airways System amounted to $478 million of
6 Air-Line Industry Investigation, op. cit. pp. 1296, 1298.
7 Ibid. p. 1112.
8 Separation of Air Mail Pay from Subsidy, Committee print reproduced
in 17 J. Air L. & Com. 333-346 (Summer 1950). See also address by Edw. C.
Sweeney, "Identification of Air Mail Subsidy and Its Effect on Airline Communities," 17 J. Air L. & Com. 459 (Autumn 1950).
9 Air-line Industry Investigation. (Testimony of D. W. Rentzel, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, April 14, 1949) p. 177.
10 Competitive Transportation Review, Association of American Railroads,
November 1950, p. 10.
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which nearly three-fourths was for operation and maintenance and the
remainder was classed as "cost of establishment." 11 According to the
Federal budget, expenditures for the development, installation, and
operation of airway facilities are estimated at $136 million for the fiscal
year 1951. As now projected, the system of electronic airway navigation aids under the so-called SC-31 program is expected to require 15
years for completion and will cost an estimated $1,113,000,000.12
The problem in connection with airport and airway aids is to
determine the proper shares attributable to the several classes of beneficiaries - government and the military, private flying, and commercial airlines. Then arises the question of suitable user charges. To date
the air lines have paid no user charges for the Federal airways facilities
and other navigation aids. However, the Civil Aeronautics Administration has proposed that "the initial step toward making the Federal
Airways self-supporting beginning in 1953, with a tax of 1.5 cents
per gallon on high-octane aviation gasoline." The estimated return
from such a tax would be $8,500,000 annually.'8
Commercial air lines ordinarily pay airport landing fees at rates
determined by negotiations between the municipality and the carrier.
Through landing fees and other revenue sources, including terminal
building concessions, it is believed that, within a comparatively few
years, the majority of the large terminal-type airports can be made
self-supporting. 1 4 In June this year a spokesman for the United States
Chamber of Commerce recommended to a House subcommittee that
the Federal Airport Act should be amended to exclude local and personal flying airports, and all airport buildings and land, from participation in federal aid and make it clear that federal-aid funds should
not be made available for airport maintenance. The funds, he added,
should be restricted to the federal share of costs of grading, drainage,
runway construction, lighting and radio aids to navigation at airports
of interstate importance. 1 5
INFANT INDUSTRY AND DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS

Direct air-mail subsidies and indirect airway and airport aids to air
commerce have been justified on the two grounds of infant industry
and national defense. It has long been a tradition in this country to
encourage the early growth of desired transport techniques through
public aids and subsidies. While there is feeling in some quarters that
commercial air transportation is no longer an infant industry and has
passed the stage of "coddling and wet nursing," the defense argument
11 Dearing, Charles L. and Wilfred Owen. National TransportationPolicy.
Wash. D. C., Brookings Institution, 1949, p. 21.

Behling, Burton N. op. cit. p. 43.
13 Ibid. p. 44.
'4 Bollinger, Lynn L., Alan Passen and Robert McElfresh, Terminal Airport
Financing and Management. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
12

Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1946, p. 4.

15 Competitive TransportationReview, op. cit., July 1950, p. 9.
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nevertheless still weighs heavily.

To appreciate this we need only

refer to the Report of the CongressionalAviation Policy Board (1948)
which states:
"Airway facilities which give scheduled dependability to civil
air lines also give tactical dependability to military air forces.
Airports which serve the burden of national and international traffic also can base tactical or strategic combat squadrons. Transport
fleets which serve commerce in peace can tie together tactical and
administrative requirements in war."
From the military viewpoint, it would seem that an industry with
the maximum number of modern planes and trained personnel is
desired as a potential reservoir to draw upon in an emergency. 6
In view of defense considerations it may seem academic to anticipate a self-sustaining system of commercial air transport in the near
future. Nevertheless, this should not be abandoned as a long-term
goal. In the meantime it seems highly desirable to make a reasonable
attempt to earmark and budget those public funds devoted to air commerce on behalf of national defense. There are questions of economics
which cannot be overlooked in the logistics of all-out modern war. As
stated by the Secretary of Defense in his report for 1948: "One of the
great problems from which the Military Establishment cannot divorce
itself is the complex one of securing proper balance between military
necessities and national solvency. The capacity for making war is not
separable from economics any more than it is from diplomacy."
REGULATION OF COMPETITION
How much competition is desirable in commercial air transportation? Is excessive competition responsible for the postwar financial
difficulties of the airlines? If competition is to be controlled, what
standards should guide such control? What effects might result from
modifying or relinquishing some of the present controls over competition? What effects might result from continuing or intensifying present restrictions on competition?
Many airline witnesses appearing during the Senate Air-line Industry Investigation have criticized the Civil Aeronautics Board for excessive "duplication and triplication of routes" resulting from overly
17
liberal issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity.
However, the Chairman of the Board took the position that over-optimism with regard to the postwar expansion of the air transport market
was not solely confined to the Civil Aeronautics Board.'
Had not the
carriers who now complained of excessive competition been the very
carriers who had requested and received the majority of the additional
16 Air-line Industry Investigation, op. cit., statement by Richard Hellman,
p. 2124.
17 Ibid., pp. 671, 742, and 1127 (Testimony of Messrs. Patterson, Smith,

and Rickenbacker).

18 Ibid., p. 55 and 60.
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routes approved by the Board after lengthy hearings? Suppose the
market had expanded and the Board had been extremely conservative
in approving new routes and route extensions, would the Board then
have been guilty of stifling a dynamic industry or encouraging monopolistic tendencies? Hindsight is always better than foresight.
What policy has been prescribed by the Congress with regard to
regulation of competition in air transportation? The Declaration of
Policy in the Civil Aeronautics Act (Section 2) directs the Board to
consider the matter of competition as follows: " (c) The promotion of
adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive pactices; (d) Competition
to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of
the national defense." It is clear from this that our public policy
favors competition with the exception of unfair or destructive competitive practices. Congress left it to the Board to determine the extent
of competition necessary to assure the sound development of air transportation.
THE ROUTE PATTERN

The present air route pattern is the result of competition and the
combined judgment of the Post Office Department and the Civil Aeronautics Board. Competitive bidding for air mail contracts produced
the basic pattern of the 39,267-mile domestic system in 1938 which
constituted the so-called "grandfather routes" inherited by the Civil
Aeronautics Board from the Post Office Department. Subsequently,
competitive applications for certificates of public convenience and
necessity awarded upon basis of the judgment of the Board caused the
domestic routes to expand from 39,000 miles to 146,000 miles and the
9
international and overseas routes from 31,000 miles to 210,000 miles.'
Eloquent testimony, copious briefs and a most convincing array of
exhibits were showered on the Board. The public, represented by
chambers of commerce, frequently asked leave to intervene, always
in favor of new routes or route extensions proposed. About the only
opposition came from other air carriers whose motives were somewhat
transparent. Statistical trends pointed upward. It is not surprising
that the Civil Aeronautics Board found its "sales resistance" no match
for such enthusiasm.
Now, however, the tide has turned: competition in air transportation is believed by many to be excessive. But, how much competition
is just the right amount? How much is too much? At the present
time, we have 16 common carrier trunk lines, 17 feeder lines, and 2
helicopter services operating under "permanent" or "temporary" cer19 Adams, Russell B., "The Air Route Pattern Problem."
& Com. 127 (Spring 1950).

17 J. of Air L.
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tificates.2 0 We also have a considerable number of non-scheduled socalled "irregular air carriers" providing low-price "aircoach" service
and three certificated air-freight carriers. Neither the irregulars nor
the air-freight carriers receive any air mail subsidy. While this list is
not complete, it may be said to fairly represent the amount of competition now present in the air transport system of the United States. Is
this too much competition? Are there now too many air carriers?
Would it be sound public policy to "freeze" the existing competitive
pattern of common carriers? Should the existing domestic route pattern serving some 600 cities be established as the permanent inflexible
sovereignty of the existing certificate-holders? Shall the future competitive pattern be static or dynamic? Shall all newcomers, even when
not desirous of mail subsidy, be considered to be undesirable "interlopers" molesting the tranquillity and stability of the protected oligopoly of "pioneers"? Shall the wings of commercial flying be clipped in
order to accomplish a public utility status in air transportation by legislative fiat in spite of the fact that air transportation lacks the economic
characteristics of typical public utility industries?
SHALL AIR TRANSPORT BE REGULATED AS A PUBLIC UTILITY?

Today, the public utility concept has become so broad as to practically defy clear definition. The term is used to cover a variety of unlike situations. Unfortunately, the indiscriminate use of the term
public utility has led to the assumption that all so-called public utilities
should be subjected to the same type of public regulation. Thus, not
only railroads but motor, water, and air carriers are loosely called public utilities despite vast differences between the economic characteristics of these transportation industries as compared with the typical
characteristics of gas, electric power, and telephone utilities.
The traditional purpose of public utility regulation was to protect
the consumers from the results of the "natural monopoly" characteristics of railroads as well as gas, electric and telephone utilities. Yet the
philosophy of railroad regulation still attempts to enforce competition
between railroads, whereas in the gas, electric, and telephone utilities
our regulatory policy long ago abandoned enforced competition in favor of closely regulated monopoly or duopoly. Still the railroads had
(until 1920 at least) sufficient monopoly power to justify similar types
of controls as were applied to the other monopolistic utilities.
After 1920, Federal regulation of railroads took on the somewhat
contradictory policy of protection to existing carriers (at least in "lip
service") combined with traditional restraint of monopoly by enforcement of competition and control of prices and services. Government
then took on the role of entrepreneuras well as that of policeman. As
is well known, railroads are today so completely regulated as to have
20 Article by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, op. cit. p. 253.
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lost nearly all of the prerogatives of management essential to competitive private enterprise.
In 1935, largely upon the recommendation of the railroads and certain government agencies, the Motor Carrier Act was passed containing
nearly all of the contradictory elements which had developed during
the previous half century of railroad regulation. Then in 1938 the
Civil Aeronautics Act was passed containing control of entry and many
other provisions literally copied from the Motor Carrier Act. It is significant that both of these laws were passed with the declared purpose
of stabilizing both the motor carrier and air carrier industries. Conditions in each of these new transport industries prior to Federal regulation were said to be "chaotic." Yet neither motor nor air transportation
regulation was the result of the public clamor which demanded restrictive regulation of the railroads. Perhaps the shipping and traveling
public preferred the so-called "chaos" of free competition as compared
with the "stability of government control." Very significantly it was
not the public, but the larger and stronger of the existing air carriers in
1938, who asked a most obliging Federal Government to assume the
same dual role of entreprenuer and policeman which it had been performing for the railroads since 1920. Temporary security was won by
the sacrifice of future freedom.
Yet the Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act was unable to reach
the conclusion that air transportation conformed to the ordinary concept of a public utility. The Congress "was trying to evolve a type of
regulation which would keep the benefits of competition. It was
attempting to combine the best features of the regulation of public
utilities and competition under the private enterprise system." 21
As stated by former Chairman O'Connell of the Civil Aeronautics
Board:
"There are at least some reasons to believe that the inevitability of the monopoly idea is not as present (in the air transport
industry) as in some types of industries . . .You do not
terrific amount of fixed capital investment . . . in the
business, which is involved in electric-light plants or other
as well as the railroads. The capital investment is very

have the
aviation
utilities,
small." 22

It may be added that, while it requires more capital to engage in air
transport than in motor transport, the amount in either case is minuscule as compared with that required to build a railroad or a gas plant.
Actually it may be said that the only way to achieve conditions
approaching monopoly in air transport is by closely restricting entry to
this industry.
21 Air-line Industry Investigation, op. cit., Joseph J. O'Connell, Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in reply to Senator Bricker, who had said, "A public
utility generally is considered to be more efficient if it is not competitive ...
Competition in the public utility field is always inefficient if you have sufficient
and adequate public regulation," p. 53.
22 Ibid., p. 54.
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PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION VS. RESPONSIBLE FREE COMPETITION

The largest part of the investment in an airline consists of aircraft,
which, being of fairly standard design, are an extremely mobile form of
capital. This facilitates both the entrance and exit of capital from the
industry in contrast to the great immobility of railroad and utility
plant capital. Another significant difference between the airlines
which Senator Johnson calls "quasi-utilities" 23 and the typical utility
industries is the ratio of fixed and variable costs. As presently operated, by far the largest proportion of airline costs is variable - a very
small proportion is fixed. Ordinary public utilities, on the other
hand, are faced with a large element of fixed cost. The desire for combination, to achieve large-scale efficiency and decreasing costs, plus a
strong motive for discriminatory pricing are thus logical in the ordinary utilities and in the railroad business. These economic characteristics are not evident to any appreciable extent in the air transport
industry of the present day.
Aside from the element of monopoly control present in public utility regulation, there are also practical physical limitations which argue
against competitive gas mains, power lines, or street car lines down city
streets. While the physical limitations of a single airport and its approaches are undeniably limited, the limitations against additionalairports are more often economic than physical. Furthermore, the
majority of our airports today are substantially under-utilized. It is
certain that most airports would welcome more competitive air transport services in place of restricted competition. Can anyone think of a
single case of a municipality objecting to the Civil Aeronautics Board
certifying additional air carriers to serve its airport or airports? As for
the airspace, is there any medium available to domestic and world commerce which is as limitless? Here again, economic limitations, it
would appear, are more controlling than physical limitations.
New electronic aids to air navigation, including the omnidirectional ranges (of which 294 are now in operation of'a planned 409)
will make possible relatively unobstructed traffic between domestic air
terminals and promise to vastly improve the safety and dependability
of air transportation. 24 The "omnirange" provides a large number of
courses. Allowing a course width of 15 degrees, for example, there are
24 flight paths to or from the range.
Since neither natural monopoly considerations nor physical limitations argue against relatively free competition in' air transportation, we
are left with the question of which policy will yield the greatest fruits public utility regulation or responsible free competition. It is believed by the writer that responsible free competition is vastly superior
to irresponsible, uncontrolled competition. It is also believed to be
23 Article by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 257.
24 Air-line Industry Investigation, op. cit., statement by D. W. Rentzel, Ad-

ministrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration, pp. 1,944 and 1,945.
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superior to competition arbitrarilyrestricted by considerations
other
25
responsibility.
financial
and
conduct
safe
of
those
than
CONCLUSION

It may be concluded that public policy toward commercial air
transportation needs re-examination especially with regard to subsidy
and restriction of competition. Perhaps the problem today is not too
much competition but too much subsidized competition. Responsible
free competition cannot succeed as long as the solvency of all competitors is guaranteed by the government. The first step - that of separating subsidy from air mail pay - is already under way. Perhaps this
will lead to eventual solution of the subsidy problem. The next step
should be the recognition that air transportation is not inherently the
type of industry which should be subjected to traditional railroad or
public utility regulation. Can responsible, fair competition ever be
excessive? Granted - opening the door to ambitious but responsible
newcomers may constantly threaten the stability of the "pioneers" but will it not over the years improve the stability and virility of the air
transport industry? Restraint of competition, on the other hand, inevitably leads to the substitution of bureaucratic controls for managerial
freedom and initiative. In the long run it may easily lead to the socialization of transport. Maximum competition, only restricted to insure
fairness and responsibility, has been the key to the great accomplishments of the American system of private enterprise. Let us consider
carefully before abandoning this principle in our public policy toward
commercial air transportation.
25 An interesting sidelight on this is revealed by the following excerpts from
a telegram to the Civil Aeronautics Board signed by Governor Ernest Gruening
of Alaska: ". . . air transportation is indispensible to the life and economy of
Alaska. The regular certificated carriers have not and do not begin to take care
of Alaska's needs . .. Alaska is absolutely dependent upon the service now provided by the non-scheduled and irregular carriers. It would be a crippling blow
to our entire economy to restrict them." (Air-line Industry Investigation, op. cit.,
p. 1,197.) It may well be that the Alaskan conditions referred to here are unique
and temporary in some respects.

